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Abstract 
This paper proposes a method that finds a 
preference relation on a set of acts from the 
knowledge of an ordering on events describing 
the decision-maker's uncertainty and an ordering 
of consequences of acts, describing the decision 
maker's preferences. However, contrary to 
classical approaches to decision theory, this 
method does not resort to any numerical 
representation of utility nor uncertainty and is 
purely ordinal. It is shown that although many 
axioms of Savage theory can be preserved and 
despite the intuitive appeal of the ordinal method, 
the approach is inconsistent with a probabilistic 
representation of uncertainty. It leads to the kind 
of uncertainty theory encountered in non­
monotonic reasoning (especially preferential and 
rational inference). Moreover the method turns 
out to be either very little decisive or to lead to 
very risky decisions, although its basic principles 
look sound. This paper raises the question of the 
very possibility of purely symbolic approaches 
to Savage-like decision-making under uncertainty 
and obtains preliminary negative results. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Savage decision theory (Savage, 1972), a decision 
problem is cast in the framework of a set of states (of the 
world) and a set of consequences. An act is viewed as a 
mapping f from the finite state space S to the consequence 
set X, namely in each state s the result of f is f(s) e X. 
Savage is interested in the following problem: Starting 
from a user-driven preference relation over acts, i.e., (XS, 
;::), and axioms that such a preference relation should obey 
if the decision-maker is "rational", construct a relation 
representing uncertainty on the subsets of S, and a 
preference relation on the consequences. If (XS, ;::) 
satisfies suitable properties then the uncertainty on S can 
be represented by a probability distribution p, the 
tThis paper is a fully revised and extended version of a 
preliminary workshop paper (Dubois et a!., 1997). 
preference relation on X by a utility function u, and the 
preference relation on acts by expected utility: 
f;:: g <=> Lse S p(s)u(f(s)) ;:: Lse s p(s)u(g(s)). 
In this research, we are first interested in the converse 
problem, namely: if an uncertainty relation on events in 
2S is given, and a preference relation on consequences is 
given as well, how can a preference relation on acts be 
recovered with a purely symbolic approach? This problem 
is realistic because a decision maker is not necessarily 
capable of describing his state of uncertainty by means of 
a probability distribution, nor may he be able to quantify 
his preferences on X. A natural technique that solves this 
problem is described. Applying this technique to a 
comparative probability relation on events we get a non­
transitive relation on acts. However this anomaly is 
avoided if we assume a possibility ordering on events. 
A characterization of this kind of approach is obtained by 
preserving the basic axioms of Savage augmented with an 
axiom sanctioning the proposed ordinal act-ordering 
technique, but without assuming transitivity of 
indifference between acts. However as shown here, the 
uncertainty relation obtained in this general setting is 
closely related to preferential inference in nonmonotonic 
reasoning and the decision guidelines obtained in this 
setting are questionable. 
2 FROM UNCERTAINTY AND 
PREFERENCE RELATIONS TO AN 
ORDERING OF ACTS 
This section introduces a natural technique to compute a 
preference relation on acts from a purely symbolic 
perspective. Let (2S, ;::u) be an uncertainty relation on 
events. We assume that ;::U is a complete partial ordering, 
non-trivial (S >u 0), and faithful to deductive inference: 
A!;;;;;B => A:S:u B. 
As usual, let us define the indifference � u and the strict 
relation < u induced from ;::U by: 
A �u B iff A :S:u B and B :S:u A 
A < u B iff A :5::u B and not (B :S:u A). 
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The preference on X is just a complete partial ordering �p. 
It is assumed that X has at least two elements x and y s.t. 
X >p y. 
If no commensurability assumption can be made, a natural 
way of lifting (�u. :$;p) on xs is to assume that an act f is 
at least as promising as an act g iff the event [f ;?: g] 
formed by the disjunction of states in which f gives 
results at least as good as g, is at least as likely as the 
event [g <:: f], formed by the disjunction of states in which 
g gives results at least as good as f. A state s is as a more 
promising state for f than for g iff f(s) <::p g(s). Hence, we 
construct the preference between acts and the corres­
ponding indifference and strict preference relations as: 
Definition (L). 
f<::g iff [f<::g] <::u [g<::f] where [f<::g] = {s, f(s) <::p g(s)}; 
f - g iff f<::g and g:$;f; 
f>g iff f;?:g and not(g�f). 
This approach seems to be very natural, and is the first 
one that comes to mind when information is only 
available under the form of an uncertainty relation on 
events and a preference relation on consequences, if the 
preference and uncertainty scales are not commensurate. 
The properties of the relations <::, -, and > on xs will 
depend on the properties of ;?:u. The most obvious choice 
for <::u is a qualitative probability (e.g., Fishburn, 1986) 
Definition. <::u is a qualitative probability iff 
i) ;?:u is complete and transitive 
ii) S>u 0. v A :<!u 0 
iii) A<::0, A11(BuC)=0 ==> (B;?:uC<=>AuB<::u AuC). 
A first negative result is that if <::u is a qualitative 
probability ordering then relation > in xs is not 
necessarily transitive. So the ordinal approach embodied in 
definition (L) cannot agree with Savage decision theory. 
Example. 
States sl s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 
Pro b. 2/9 1/9 119 2/9 1/9 2/9 
f 5 100 0 0 -10 -10 
g 0 -15 100 -10 0 10 
h -25 0 -40 20 40 0 
It is easy to verify that : 
P([f<::g])=P( { s 1 ,s2,s4} )=5/9 >P([g<::f])=P( { s3,s5,s6} )=4/9 
P((g;?:h])=P( { s 1 ,s3,s6 })=5/9 > P([h<::g])=P( { s2,s4,s5 })=4/9 
P([f<::h])=P( { s1 ,s2,s3} )=4/9 >P([h<::f])=P( { s4,s5,s6} )=5/9. 
Hence f>g>h but h>f. Note that the intransitivity result 
does not depend on the figures in the table insofar as the 
sign of the utility values is respected. This situation can 
be viewed as an analog of the Condorcet paradox in social 
choice, here in the setting of decision under uncertainty. 
Thinking about an alternative approach, the simplest type 
of qualitative uncertainty ordering are those induced by 
necessity measures (Dubois, 1986): 
Definition. <::N is a qualitative necessity ordering iff 
i) <::N is complete and transitive 
ii) S >N 0, V A <::N 0 
iii) B �N C ==> A 11 B ;?:N A 11 C. 
They are also epistemic entrenchments in the sense of 
Gii.rdenfors (Dubois and Prade, 1991 ), and comparative 
possibility orderings of Lewis (1973). From now on, we 
assume that :<!u :::; �N. Any necessity ordering can be 
represented by a necessity function on an ordinal scale: 
Property (Dubois, 1986). 3N such that: B �N C <=> 
N(B) ;;:: N(C) where N(F) e [0, I] and N(F 11 G) :::; 
min(N(F), N(G)) whatever F and G. 
Necessity orderings are simple since that they can be 
derived from a complete partial ordering on states only, 
and can be encoded as a possibility distribution. We can 
now write in accordance with definition (L): 
f<::g <=> N([t;?:g]) ;?: N([g�f]). (1) 
In terms of possibility measures (Zadeh, 1978), I1(A) = 
I - N( A), then: 
Property. f<::g <=> I1([f>g]) � I1([g>f]) where [f>g] = {s, 
f(s) >p g(s)}. 
3 PROPERTIES OF THE 
POSSIBILITY -DRIVEN RELATION 
ON ACTS 
In accordance with Savage, we use the following 
definitions: 
Definitions. 
• f1A u g1 A. is the act s.t. (fiA u g1 A.) (s) = f(s) if seA , 
= g(s) otherwise. 
• f<::A g iff'v'h f1A u hi A<:: giA u h1A. 
• A null iff V'f,g , f :<!A g 
• V'x,y e X, x�y iff fx�fy where fx: V'se S fx(s)=x and 
fy: Vse S fy(s):::;y 
f1A u g1 A is like a lottery whose result is state dependent. 
f �A g denotes the notion of conditional preference over 
acts. A null event is a set of states in which the result of 
acts does not matter. The reason for this indifference is 
that the agent considers that this act will never happen. 
The last point identifies constant acts fx to their (unique, 
state-free) consequence, so that X � xs. In case of 
necessity measures on S, the following properties of (XS, 
�) can be established, where<:: is defined by (1): 
Property. V'x,y e X X� y ¢:::> X <::p y. 
-
-
Property. f �A g <=> N([f2!g] u A ) � N([g�f] u A) 
<=>I1C[f>g] 11 A) <:: I1([g>f] 11 A). 
Proof (sketch). Let us denote B = [fiA u h1 A. ;:::: giA u 
hJA.)] and C = [fiA u h1A. � giA u h1A.l. 
Remark that, by definition, whatever h: B = [f;::::g] u A 
and C = [g;::::f] u A . o 
Hence: N(B);:::: N(C) <=> f ;:::A g . 
Property. A null <=> TI(A) = ll(0). 
Property Pl' (Restricted Savage's Pl) 
• (XS,;::::) is complete : f;::::g or g;::::f for all pairs of acts; 
• The indifference relation - is reflexive, symmetrical; 
• The strict relation > on xS is a transitive, irreflexive, 
partial order; 
• f>g and g - h => f;::::h. 
Proofs. the only difficulty is to prove that > is 
transitive. Let f,g,h be three acts s.t. f>g, g>h, h;::::f, i.e. 
Il([f < g]) < Il([f>g]) 
II( [g < h]) < Il(g>h)) 
Il([f < h]);:::: Il([f>h]). (i) 
Let us partition S in 13 subsets: 
A ={ s/f(s)=g(s)=h(s)} 
C = {s/f(s)=g(s)>h(s)} 
E = { s/f(s)=h(s)>g(s)} 
G = { s/g(s)=h(s)>f(s)} 
I= {s/f(s)<h(s)<g(s)} 
K = { s/h(s)<f(s)<g(s)} 
M = {s/h(s)< g(s) < f(s)}. 
B ={ s/f(s)=g(s)<h(s)} 
D={s/f(s)=h(s)<g(s)} 
F = {s/g(s)=h(s)<f(s)} 
H = { s/f(s)<g(s)<h(s)} 
J = { s/g(s)<f(s)<h(s)} 
L={s g(s)<h{s)<f(s)} 
The system of inequations (i) can be rewritten as: 
max(e,f,j,l,m)>max(d,g,h,i, k) (ii-1) 
max( c,d,i,k,m)>max(b,e,h,j,l) (ii-2) 
max(b,g,h,i,j) ;:::: max(c,f,k,l,m) (ii-3) 
(where a is the possibility degree of A, etc.). It is 
inconsistent. Indeed, from ii-1 and ii-2, one must have 
max(f,c,m) greater than all of b,d,e,g,h,i,j,k,l, and this is 
in contradiction with ii-3. o 
Postulate PI of Savage states that the weak preference ;:::: 
on acts should be a complete and transitive relation. So 
the only difference between P'1 and Savage's P1 is the 
lack of transitivity of the indifference relation. This lack 
of transitivity can be observed in very simple cases, where 
only 3 states and 2 consequences are defined. Our 
formalism also differs from Lehmann's (1996) who 
assumes that ;:::: is not complete but the indifference is 
transitive. Non-transitive indifference is natural if f � f 
means closeness. But our fonnalism satisfies some of his 
axioms, in particular : 
Property. If f ;:::A g and f-A g => f;:::: g. (U) 
This easily checked property, which sounds like an 
unanimity principle, is usually deduced from Savage's 
axiomatic decision theory (however, using the transitivity 
of;::::). 
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Property P2. The preference relation ;:::: obeys the sure 
thing principle: 
Vf,g, h, h' f1A u hi A;:::: giA u h1 A. 
<=> f1A U h'1A.;:::: g1A U h' I A 
Sketch of proof. This is because [fiA u h1 A ;:::: giA u 
hj Al = Au ([f;:::: g] n A) does not depend on h. 
The sure thing principle is the cornerstone of Savage 
decision theory, and it is instrumental in getting a 
probabilistic representation of uncertainty. The fact that it 
is compatible here with a possibilistic representation is 
due to the fact that indifference between acts is not 
transitive. 
Property P3 (Compatibility of condition al 
preference with constant acts). 
VA!;;;; S, A not null, fx ;:::A fy <=> x;::::y. 
This is Savage Postulate P3. It has intuitive appeal in any 
framework where the sure thing principle applies. 
Proof. 
• x- y <=> x-p y => [fx;::::fy] = [fy;:::: fx] = S thus: 
- -
'rl A, N([fx;::::fy] u A) = N([fy;:::: fx] u A)<=> 
'rl A fx -A fy (i) 
• x>y<=> x>py => [fx>fy]=S and [fy;::::fx]=0 thus: 
'rl A, [fx>fy] n A =  A and [fy>fx] n A =  0 
A is not null: TI(A) >I1(0) and Il ([ fx>fy]nA) = 
TI(A)>Il([fy>fx]nA). Hence: fx >A fy (ii) 
• By (i) and (ii): x;::::y => fx ;:::A fy. Moreover, by (ii) 
contraposed: fx �A fy => x:::>y. Exchanging x and y: fy ::>A 
h=>y�. 0 
(S,;::::u) and (X,;::::p) induce (XS,;::::); let us now reproject xs 
on zS by considering 2-consequence acts w(C)x.y where 
x>y and ro(C)X.Y(s)=x if SEC, ro(C)X·Y=y otherwise 
Property P4. Restriction to 2-consequence acts. 
Vx,y,x',y' s.t. x>y, x'>y', ro(A)x,y;:::: ro(B)x.y 
<=> ro(A)X' ,y';:::: ro(B )X' ,y'. 
Proof. Since x>y and x'>y': 
[w(C)x.y;::::w(B)X·Y] =CuD does not depend on (x,y) 
-
-
Thus: ro(A)x.y;::::ro(B)x.y <=> N(A u B);:::: N(A u B) 
<=> ro(A)x',y';:::: W(B)x',y' 0 
This property which is exactly Savage Postulate P4 
enables events A and B to be consistently compared by 
fixing x>y arbitrarily when selecting w (A)X,y and 
ro(B)X·Y. It operates a restriction from xS to 2S. 
Definition. A;::::B <=> V x>y, w(A)x,y;::::ro(B)X,y 
Lehmann (1996) defines A ;:::: B in the same way, but 
drops P4. 
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Properties. 
� <=> 3 x>y, w(A)X,Y�w(B)X,y (due to P4) 
- -
<=> N{ B u A) � N(A u B) 
¢::) IT{A rl B)� IT( A rl B). 
So, although different from �N, the relation � obtained 
via lifting followed by restriction can be expressed in 
terms of the necessity ordering :2:N, and it refines it. 
Finally, postulate P5 of Savage (X has at least two 
elements x and y s.t. x>y) will be trivially satisfied in any 
non-trivial decision theory. 
4 THE POSSIBILISTIC LIKELIHOOD 
RELATION 
The relation ;::: on 2S is closely related to the necessity and 
possibility orderings induced by N (and its dual IT); more 
specifically it is a refinement of both orderings: 
Properties. • N(A) >N (B) � A>B 
• IT(A) >IT (B)� A>B. 
But it may happen that N(A )  = N(B) and A>B or that 
I1(A) = IT(B) and A>B. Notice that � on 2s is not 
transitive since: 
IT<A n �) = ITc� n B) * O<A n c) = m"A n C). IT(B n C )  = IT(B n C) 
In fact, the indifference � on 2s is trans1t1ve when 
considering only IT-mutually exclusive events: ITCA r1 B) 
= min(IT(A),IT(B)) means that A and B are not IT­
mutually exclusive according to IT, and conversely A and 
B are said to be II -mutually exclusive if IT(A r1 B) -:t 
min(IT(A),IT(B)) that is if IT CA n B)< min(il(A n B), 
IlCA rl B)). 
Property. Il(A)�IT(B) <=> A:2:B iff A and B are IT­
mutually exclusive. 
In other terms, :2: refines :2:N and the dual possibilistic 
ordering �Il for not IT-mutually exclusive events. 
The partial ordering > on events is a special case of the 
so-called "discrimax" relation between vectors (Dubois et 
al., 1996; Fargier et al., 1993): 
A>B <=>maxie 2) (A,B)llj;::: maxie 2) (A,B)bi 
where llj = 0( { Sj}) if Sj e A and .0 (A,B) = { i, aj 'i' bj}. 
Finally, since ;::: on xs satisfies Savage's sure thing 
principle, we have the additivity condition (iii) of 
qualitative probabilities and the autoduality property: 
A::::B <=> A�B. 
However, since the indifference relation between events is 
not transitive, this relation cannot be represented by a 
probability. Because the relation on events is closely 
related to necessity and possibility orderings, we shall call 
it possibilistic likehood. 
5 LINK WITH NONMONOTONIC 
REASONING 
To summarize, the possibilistic likelihood relation 
obtained in Section 3 is a qualitative probability ordering, 
but for the transitivity of indifference. The derived 
possibilistic Iikehood relation ;::: also verifies properties 
that are NOT satisfied by qualitative probabilities: 
Properties. 
• A r1 (B u C) = 0 and A� and A:2:C � A � B u C 
• A r1 (B u C) = 0 and A>B and A>C � A>B u C 
• if A, B, C are pairwise disjoint then A u B > C and 
A u C > B imply A > B u C. 
The latter property is closely related to one of the 
characteristic properties for uncertainty functions that 
represent acceptance (Dubois and Prade, 1995b; Friedman 
and Halpern, 1996), i.e., a function inducing orderings for 
which for any not empty set A, the set {B, A nB > 
AnB} (the set of propositions accepted by > when A is 
true) is deductively closed. A nonmonotonic consequence 
relation can be derived from such acceptance orderings as : 
AfvB<=:>A n B > A n B. 
The comparative possibility ordering IT(A) > Il(B) can 
also be related to nonmonotonic inference A fv B which 
expresses that IT(AnB) > IT(An B) for a possibility 
measure IT. Possibility theory is closely related to 
preferential inference in nonmonotonic reasoning, as 
defined by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990). The 
properties of preferential inference are 
RR : A>0 � A fv A. 
AND: AnC > An C and AnB > An B � AnBnC > 
An(CuB ) 
OR: AnC>An C , BnC>Bn C � (AuB )nC > 
(AuB)nC 
RW: B�C , AnB > AnB � AnC > AnC 
CM: AnB > AnB and AnC > An C � AnBnC > 
AnBnC. 
CUT: AnB > AnB and AnBnC> AnBnC � AnC > 
-
An C.  
Then, an inference relation fv is preferential if and only if 
there exists a set of positive possibility measuresl ff 
such that (Dubois, Prade 1995a): 
1 A possibility measure is positive iff, 'I A, Il(A) > I1(0). 
A 1-v B iff 'v'Il E s::' Il(A (1 B ) > Il( A (1 B). 
In (Benferhat et al.,l992) it is shown that when contains a 
single possibility measure, the obtained consequence 
relation is characteristic of rational inference of Lehmann 
(Lehmann and Magidor, 1992), that is an inference which 
satisfies rational monotony on top of the above axioms: 
- -
Axiom (RM): An B >A n  B and An c :::;A n C => 
AnBnC > AnBnC. 
Since the sets AnB and AnB are disjoint it holds: 
A 1-v B �An B > An B ¢=> Il(A n B)> Il(A n B) 
where > is the strict possibilistic likehood relation 
associated with IT. Conversely, it is easy to check that 
A>B can be written as: 
-
All.BI'v BuA 
where ll. denotes the symmetric difference. 
6 FROM AXIOMS ON PREFERENCE 
OVER ACTS TO A THEORY OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
Since the five first of Savage axioms have been retrieved 
(up to the transitivity of indifference) in the previous 
investigation, it is in terestin g to start the other way 
round, namely given a preference relation <:: on acts, that 
satisfies the above Savage-like properties, determine the 
relation on events induced by 2: using Savage's P4 and the 
relation on consequences using Savage's P3 that enable 
the original relation 2: on acts to be recovered using the 
lifting procedure (L). Doing so, the approach is much 
more general: the assumption that uncertainty is 
represented by possibility measures is no longer necessary 
since as in the tradition of decision theory, the uncertainty 
representation now comes from the properties of the 
preference over acts only. 
Let xs be a set of acts equipped with a preference relation 
2: such that 
• P'1: (XS ,<::) is complete: d t2d2 or d2<::d 1 for all pairs of 
acts, 
(XS ,>) is a transitive, irreflexive, partially ordered 
set, 
(XS ,-)defines a symmetrical and reflexive relation. 
• P2: (XS ,2:) satisfies the sure thing principle. 
• P3: (XS,<::) satisfies Savage's axiom of compatibility 
with constant acts. 
• P4 : (XS ,2:) satisfies Savage's P4 axiom about 2-
consequence acts. 
• P5': 3 x, y, z three constant acts such that x>y>z. 
NB: Note that Savage's P5 has been strengthened to 3 
consequence sets and P' l reflects the lack of transitivity of 
indifference. Other postulates of Savage are more technical 
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and not as convincing. One pertains to infinite state 
spaces. The other is meant to cope with infinite 
consequence sets. 
From the above set of axioms, we get the following 
properties of the relation on events (most of these proofs 
are easy and omitted to the sake of brevity): 
Properties. 
• S>0 (Pr. 6.1) 
• 'v' A!;;;; S, A<::0 (Pr. 6.2) 
• An(BuC) = 0 ::::? ( B<::C � AuB <:: AuC) 
(Pr. 6.3 additivity) 
-
• A>B ¢::::> AnB > AnB • A<::B <=> AnB <:: AnB 
- -
Pr. 6.4) 
• A>B � A < B • A<::B � A$B Pr 6.5: auto-duality) 
• A !;;;; B ::::? B<::A (Pr 6.6: coherence with set inclusion) 
• if A!; B then B - A >0 � B>A (Pr. 6. 7) 
• A null <=> A - 0 (Pr. 6.8) 
• A>C , A!;;;; B, B - A>0 ::::? B>C (Pr. 6.9) 
• A -C, A i;;;; B, B - A>0 =? B:2:C (Pr. 6.10) 
• A>C, A� B =? B<::C (Pr. 6. 11). 
The properties (6.1- 6.6) indicate the close links between 
the uncertainty theory generated and qualitative 
probability; (6.7) and (6.8) show the importance of non­
null events. (6.9), (6. 1 0), (6.11) show that the strict 
ordering of events does not propagate totally via inclusion 
of sets, nor via indifferent events. 
6. l CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIFTING 
AXIOM 
Let us now add the lifting Axiom to our set of axioms 
characterising the preference on acts : 
L: f<::g � [f<::g] 2: [g2:f]. 
Clearly this assumption is very strong since it prescribes 
a particular behavior for the decision-maker. Under these 
conditions we can show that: 
Properties. 
• 'rl se S, {s }>0::::? 'v' A s.t. s e A, A>0 (Pr. 6.12) 
•A-0=?'v'seA{s}-0 (Pr.6.13) 
• If at least two different states of S are not null, the 
preference on X is a complete preorder (but the ordering 
of states inS may be partial) (6. 14). 
Proof of 6.14. By ( PI'), we know that 2: is complete 
and > transitive. We now have to show that the 
indifference relation -that one can define from <:: is also 
transitive on constant acts. 
Suppose that x,y, and z are three elements of X s.t. fx -
fy, fy - fz and fx>fz. 
At least two states of S are not null states. Let SJ and s2 
be two of the not null states and compare the decisions g, 
h, k: 
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g: g(sJ) = x, 
h: h(SJ) = Z, 
k: k(SJ) = y, 
g(sz) = y, 
h(sz) = x, 
k(s2) = z, 
g(s)::::xifse {sJ,sz} 
h(s)::::xifse {sJ,S2} 
k(s)::::xifse {sJ,S2}· 
From P3: fx>fz implies that fx1s1 > fzls l 
fx - fy implies that fx1s2 - fYis2· 
Since fxlsJ=g(sJ)=x and fYisJ=h(st)=z: g(sJ)>h(sJ). 
Since fYisz=g(sz)=y and fx1s2=h(s2)= x : g(sz)-h(s2). 
Thus, [g:?:h] = S and [h:?:g]= S - {SJ }. Since 
{ s 1 } >0,applying auto-duality and the lifting axiom leads 
to obtain: g>h. Similarly, [h:?:k]=S and [k:?:h]=S-{ s2}. 
Since {sz}>0, we get h>k. Similarly, [g:?:k] = S and 
[k:?:g] = S. Hence g - k. 
Hence, assuming fx - fy, fy - fz and fx>fz leads to get: 
g>h, h>k, g-k, which is in contradiction with the 
transitivity of >. Hence, - is transitive on X. o 
Property. 
(An(BuC)=0 and A>B and A>C ::::::> A>BuC); 
(An(BuC)=0 and A>B and A:?:C ::::::> A :?:  BuC). 
(6.15) 
(6.16) 
Proof (6.15). Let us suppose that A>B, A>C. From 
P5', there are three constant acts fx, fy and fz such as 
fx>fy>fz. Let us compare acts g,h,k: 
g: 
h: 
k: 
A B n C  B n C B n C  
X Z y Y 
y y X y 
z X X X 
- -
- - -
A nBnC 
y 
y 
y 
From P3: [g2:h] = B and [h2:g] = A. Since A>B, the 
lifting axiom and the autoduality property lead to: g>h (i) 
- -
From P3: [h:?:k] = C and [k2:h] = A. Since A>C, h>k (ii) 
From P3: [g:?:k] = S- (BuC) and [k:?:g] =A. 
Hence, (i), (i ) and the transitivity of > lead to: g>k, i.e., 
S- (BuC) >A. Thus, applying the autoduality property: 
A > BuC. 
Property 6.16 can be proved in the same way. o 
Hence, the type of relation we obtain on S satisfies some 
of the characteristic properties of acceptance relations (cf. 
Section 5). But it is not limited to these acceptance 
relations (which are preorders on events). 
Define now an inference relation as follows: 
Definition. A tv B iff A n  B > A n  B 
where > is the relation defined by our axiomatic and 
projected on 2S from xs. 
Properties of tv. Restricted reflexivity, OR and AND 
follow from (P'l, P2, P3, P4, PS', L). 
Proofs. 
RR: Obvious. 
AND:Consider the following acts - -
ABC ABC A BC ABC 
f X y Z Z 
g y Z X y 
h Z X y X 
[f>g] = AnB and [f<g] = AnB: f>g 
[g>h] = AnC, [h>g] = An C: g>h 
Since [f>h] = AnBnC and [h>f] =An ( C u  B) by 
transitivity of >: AnBnC >A n(CuB) 
OR is proved in the same way. D 
So, some properties of preferential inference (system P) 
are recovered. 
6. 2 GETTING SYSTEM P 
At this point of our axiomatisation, we cannot get all the 
properties of system P, but only some of them. In order 
to prove RW, CUT and CM, we need the property: 
BnC=0 and A t;;;; B and A2:C ::::::> B2:C 
which cannot be derived from our set of axioms, except if 
there are no null events (pr. 6.10 and 6.11). Null events 
generally never appear in nonmonotonic reasoning nor 
belief revision theories. But supposing that there is no 
null event is not appropriate in the context of a Savage­
like theory of decision. We prefer to add the unanimity 
axiom U proposed by Lehmann (1996): 
Property. If the relation on xs satisfies (P' 1, P2, P3, 
P4, P'5, L, U), then 
BnC=0 and A� Band A:?:C ::::::> B:?:C (6.17). 
Proof. this property is verified if B-A>0 or A>C 
(Pr. 6.10 and 6.11). Suppose that A-C and B - A -0. 
- -
Since A t;;;; B and BnC =0: Bt;;;; C , i.e. B - A = AllB � 
AnC 
From P4, P5' and P2: 
A-C ::::::> ro(A)x,y -AuC ro(C)X,y 
B- A =A nB-0 ::::::> ro( AnB)x,y -A. n c ro(0)x.y 
Let f=ro(B)x.y and g =ro(C)x.y.: 
if se AuC, f(s)=ro(A)X·Y(s) and g(s)=ro(C)x.y (s) 
if se AllC, f(s)=ro ( AnB)x.y and g(s)=ro(0)X.y (s). 
Thus f-A u c g and f-A. 1\ c g . Hence (B2): f - g, 
then, by P4, B-C o 
Property. If the relation on xs satisfies (P'1 ,P2, P3, 
P4, P'S, L, U), then nonmonotonic inference built from 
the relation projected from xs to 2s satisfies the 
properties of system P: OR, AND, RR, RW, CM, C UT . 
Sketches of proofs. 
RW can be easily proved from property 6.17 
CM : 
-
AIIBIIC AnB1 C AnBIIC AI BnC 
f X y y z 
g y z X y 
h z X y X 
From AIIB > Ail B , we get f>g. From AIIC > Ail C we 
get g>h. By transitivity of >: f>h, i.e., A 11 B n C > A - - -
11 B 11 C u A 11 B 11 C. From property 6.17 
-
(contraposition): A 11 B 11 C >A 11 B 11 C . 
We can also obtain the CUT in the same way. 
6. 3 GETTING THE POSSIBILISTIC 
LIKEHOOD RELATION 
0 
So, starting from a general framework on acts, that 
respects Savage approach to a large extent, and adding a 
particular decision rule that tolerates a qualitative 
representation of uncertainty and preference we find a 
representation of uncertainty which is representable by a 
family of possibility measures, since the preferential 
entailment of system P can be always represented in terms 
of such a family (Dubois et al. 1995a). Notice in 
particular that the order of states obtained from our 
axiomatics is not necessarily a preorder, so that it cannot 
be represented by a single possibility ordering. The 
possibilistic likehood relation of Sections 3 and 4, based 
on a preorder on states and a necessity measure is 
recovered exactly if a counterpart of rational monotony is 
added to the above set of postulates. Indeed, adding the 
RM axiom forces the relation induced from the preference 
on acts to be a complete preordering, thus corresponding 
to a single possibilistic ordering as proved in (Benfehrat 
et. al 1992), adding rational monotony to system P. The 
possibilistic likehood relation in actually a refinement of 
this possibilic ordering for not TI-mutually exclusive 
events. 
Theorem. The set of axioms (P' I, P2, P3, P4, P'S, L, 
RM, U ) is consistent. 
Proof. Since the order on acts described in Section 3 and 
4 satisfies all these axioms. 
Theorem: If (�. xs ) satisfies (P'1, P2, P3 , P4, PS'), 
the lifting axiom L, axioms U and RM, then there is a 
preorder �1t on S and a preorder q on X such as: 
�g ¢:) [f �p g] �N [g �p f] 
where N is the necessity ordering over events obtained 
from �1t over states 
Sketch of proof. A consequence of the lifting axiom 
(Pr. 6.14) we know that the projection of (�, xs) on X is 
a preorder. Let us denote �p this preorder: [f �p g] = [f � 
g]. From RM we also know that the projection (�. xs ) 
on S defines a preorder on states. Let us denote �1t this 
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preorder: s' �1t s (:::) { s'} � { s}. 
From the autoduality property, its holds that B�A <=::> - -
AnB 2 Ail B. Hence, we have to compare disjoint 
events, which are mutually exlusive, i.e., ordered by the 
possibilistic ordering �n corresponding to �1t . So : B�A - -
<==> A11B �n A1 B ¢:) B�N A. With B= [�g] and A= 
[g�f]. the lifting axiom then leads to [�g]�(g�f] � 
[�g]) �N [g�f]. 0 
7 CONCLUSION 
This result is rather negative for decision theory when 
only ordinal information about uncertainty and preference 
on consequences is available and no commensurability 
assumption is assumed between uncertainty and prefer­
ence. Despite the presence of well-known Savage axioms, 
including the sure thing principle, the admissible 
uncertainty functions do not contain any kind of prob­
ability functions. This is clearly due to the lifting axiom. 
The decision theory obtained captures either very risky 
attitudes or some that are not decisive at all. As 
preferential inference is very cautious, the relations on acts 
which do not correspond to a total ordering on states will 
not be very discriminating. On the contrary if the set of 
states is totally ordered in terms of plausibility, the 
decisions will be very risky because, as usual with 
rational inference the decision maker will always assume 
that the world is in the most normal state. Cautious 
decisions will never be preferred. 
Example. Consider the omelette example of Savage 
(1972, pages 13 to 15). The problem is whether to add an 
egg to a 5-egg omelette: The set of 6 consequences is as 
in the following table: 
ACTS 
STATES fresh egg 
break the egg in a 6 egg omelette (6) 
the omelette BIO 
break it apart in a a 6 egg omelette, 
cupBAC a cup to wash (5) 
throw it away T A a 5 egg omelette, 
one spoiled egg (2) 
rotten egg 
nothing to eat (1) 
a 5 egg omelette, 
a cup to wash (3) 
a 5 egg omelette 
(4) 
Integers between parentheses indicate the ordering of 
consequences, in decreasing order of preference. The reader 
can easily check that he agrees with this ordering. If fresh 
egg is more likely than rotten egg then A(BIO;::; BAC) = 
A(BIO � TA) = A(BAC � TA) ={fresh}> A(BAC � BIO) 
= A(TA � BIO) = A(TA � BAC) = {rotten}. So the 
decision making attitude induced by the approach is: break 
the egg in the omelette if you think the egg is fresh, 
throw it away if you think it is rotten, and do anything 
you like if you have no opinion (all acts equally preferred 
then). Clearly, this results in many starving days, and 
garbage cans with lots of spoiled fresh eggs. 
Although the lifting axiom may look reasonable, and 
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other axioms on acts innocuous, it is difficult to maintain 
that the decision guidelines offered by the theory are 
reasonable. In practice, it is advisable to act more 
cautiously, and to break the egg in a spare cup in case of 
serious doubt. In contrast the qualitative theory developed 
by Dubois and Prade (1995c) that justifies a pessimistic 
decision criterion generalizing Wald criterion looks more 
satisfactory. Applied to the egg example, it recommends 
act BAC in case of relative ignorance on the egg state; see 
(Dubois, Prade and Sabbadin, 1997). However that theory 
relies on a commensurability assumption between 
uncertainty and preference, which may be questioned by 
tenants of a purely symbolic approach. 
This paper leads to an open question: Is there an 
alternative to the lifting axiom that would enable a 
reasonably cautious and albeit decisive ordering on acts to 
be computed on the basis of uncertainty relations on 
events and consequences? In other words, how to do away 
with commensurability assumptions and/or numerical 
approaches while capturing anthropomorphic decision 
attitudes? 
One might think of reverting the lifting procedure by 
exchanging the role of states and consequences. It would 
lead to express the preference on acts in terms of a 
comparison of sets of consequences instead of sets of 
states as done here. This would make us capable of 
expressing attitudes of the decision maker in front of risk, 
something that never explicitly appears in the Savage's set 
of axioms. Indeed, a natural alternative to the lifting 
principle used in this paper would rather start by 
considering the set of consequences which are reached at 
least as certainly by decision d1 as by decision d2, namely 
{ -1 -1 } the set of consequence B(dJ � d2) = x, d1 (x) �U d2 (x) 
where d-l(x) is the set of states in S from which d leads 
to consequence x. The problem is now to compare B(dt � 
d2) and B(d2 � dt) in terms of preferences on X. Since 
B(dt � d2) is not usually a singleton on X, we need to add 
an additional hypothesis on DM's attitude in face of risk. 
Namely, if the OM is rather pessimistic (cautious), hefshe 
may consider that d1 � d2 iff minx B(dJ � d2) �P minx 
B(d2 � dJ), while if the DM is optimistic it may act on 
the basis of the d 1 � d2 iff maxx B( d 1 � d2) �P maxx 
B(d2 � dJ). We may also think of comparing minx B(dl 
� d2) with maxx B(d2 � dt ), or to refine the 'min' and 
'max' over X by 'discrimin' and 'discrimax'. The 
investigation of this approach, which supposes that we 
know something about DM's attitude, is a topic for 
further research. 
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